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The United States is an outlier among democratic countries when it comes to 
the institutions charged with running our elections. Most other democratic 
countries have an independent election authority with some insulation from 
partisan politics.1 In the United States, by contrast, partisan election administra-
tion2 is the near-universal norm among the states. Most states’ chief election 
 
* Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz 
College of Law. The author thanks David Adamany, Sam Issacharoff, Kevin Kennedy, and Justin 
Levitt for their comments on earlier drafts and Tim Myers for his excellent research assistance. 
1. See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTORAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS 
37 (2002), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/ies/index.cfm; RAPHAEL LÓPEZ-PINTOR, 
ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES AS INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE 12 (2000), available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral_systems 
andprocesses/electoral-management-bodies-as-institutions-of-governance.html;  LOUIS MASSICOTTE 
ET AL., ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAWS IN DEMOCRACIES 83–97 
(2004); Olivier Ihl, Electoral Administration, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 87, 87–89 
(Yves Déloye & Michael Bruter eds., 2007); see also infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
2. This Article uses the terms “partisan election administration,” “bipartisan election 
administration,” and “nonpartisan election administration” to refer to the manner in which chief 
election authorities are chosen. Thus, “partisan election administration” includes chief election 
officials who are elected in partisan elections, as well as those who are appointed by party-affiliated 
elected officials. “Bipartisan election administration” refers to bodies containing representatives from 
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officials—usually the secretary of state—are elected to office as nominees of their 
parties, while almost all the remaining states’ chief election authorities are 
appointed by partisan actors.3 There is greater variation at the local level, but it is 
common for county and municipal election officials to be party-affiliated as well.4 
While there have been major changes in U.S. election administration since 2000, 
the partisanship of those responsible for running elections remains largely 
unchanged. The United States has some experience with nonpartisan electoral 
institutions in other contexts, including redistricting and campaign finance, but we 
have very little experience with nonpartisan election administration at the state 
level.5 
There is one conspicuous exception to the partisan character of state election 
administration: Wisconsin’s Government Accountability Board (GAB). Establish-
ed by the Wisconsin state legislature in 2007, the GAB has responsibility for 
election administration, as well as enforcement of campaign finance, ethics, and 
lobbying laws.6 Its members are former judges chosen in a manner that is designed 
to ensure that they will not favor either major party.7 This makes the GAB unique 
among state election administration bodies in the United States. While there are 
other examples of putatively nonpartisan state entities responsible for enforce-
ment of campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics rules,8 no other state has a chief 
election administration authority with the same degree of insulation from partisan 
politics. In our age of hyperpolarized politics—of which Wisconsin has lately been 
a leading example—it is an open question whether such a nonpartisan institution 
can function effectively. With heated allegations of voter suppression coming 
from one side and equally heated allegations of voter fraud from the other, it has 
become difficult even to discuss the most important election administration 
 
two or more parties. “Nonpartisan election administration” refers to entities or persons selected in a 
way that is designed to make them independent of partisan politics. 
3. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid 
Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 974 (2005); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election 
Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 131–32 (2009). 
4. David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf & Lindsay Battles, Helping America Vote? Election 
Administration, Partisanship, and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 447, 453 (2006); 
see also David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections: Selection Methods for 
Local Election Officials, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 1257, 1262 tbl .4 (2006) (showing methods of selection in 
4500 local electoral jurisdictions). 
5. This Article uses the term “election administration” to refer to nuts-and-bolts mechanics of 
running elections, including the administration of rules regarding voter registration, voter 
identification, absentee and early voting, recounts, access to the ballot, and direct democracy. This 
corresponds to the areas of responsibility delegated to the GAB’s Elections Division under state law. 
WIS. STAT. § 5.05(2w) (2012). As used in this Article, the term “election administration” does not 
include other topics such as campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics. As explained later, another 
division of the GAB (the Ethics and Accountability Division) has responsibilities in these other areas. 
6. See id. § 5.05(1) (2012) (granting the GAB power to administer laws relating to elections and 
election campaigns). 
7. See infra notes 24–26, 28 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra Table 1. 
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questions of the day civilly—much less to run elections in a manner that 
engenders public confidence.9 
Is there any hope for nonpartisan election administration in an era of intense 
political polarization?10 This Article considers this question by examining and 
assessing the performance of Wisconsin’s GAB during its first five years of 
existence. I conclude that the GAB has been successful in administering elections 
evenhandedly and that it serves as a worthy model for other states considering 
alternatives to partisan election administration at the state level. Part I discusses 
the origins and history of the GAB, putting it in the context of other electoral 
institutions in the United States, as well as electoral institutions in other 
democratic countries. Part II discusses the most important election administration 
issues that have come before the Wisconsin GAB since its creation in 2007. As 
this discussion reveals, these years have been an exceptionally contentious period 
of time for Wisconsin. The state has seen fiercely partisan debates over such issues 
as voter registration and voter identification, errant reporting of election results in 
a very close state supreme court race, and contentious recall elections of the 
governor and prominent state legislators. Although the GAB did little to create 
these controversies, they have tested its nonpartisan structure. The Article 
concludes by evaluating the GAB’s performance during these trying times and 
considering whether the Wisconsin model should be exported to other states. 
I. THE WISCONSIN MODEL 
The GAB was created by statute (Act 1) in 2007.11 Through this legislation, 
the functions of two previously existing boards were unified under the GAB: (1) 
the State Elections Board, which was responsible for election administration and 
campaign finance, and (2) the State Ethics Board, which enforced lobbying and 
ethics rules.12 The 2007 statute abolished these boards effective 2008, transferring 
all their functions to the GAB.13 
The main impetus for creation of the GAB was not a perceived need to 
reform the administration of elections. Instead, it was the view that the preexisting 
boards “had been too lax in their enforcement of campaign finance, ethics, and 
 
9. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT 
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012) (detailing the increase in election-related litigation and allegations of 
partisanship in election administration). 
10. For an enlightening discussion of the causes of political polarization in the United States, 
see Richard Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 293 (2011). 
11. 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, WIS. STAT. § 5.05 (2010). 
12. See STEVEN F. HUEFNER, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. FOLEY, FROM 
REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 115–
17 (2007). 
13. Id. 
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lobbying laws.”14 The legislature, as well as good government groups, also thought 
it advisable to place control over all these subjects under a single entity.15 
Previously, the State Elections Board enforced campaign finance laws while the 
State Ethics Board enforced ethics and lobbying laws.16 While election 
administration was not exactly an afterthought, it was not the primary 
consideration that motivated the legislature to create the GAB.17 The bill passed 
with broad bipartisan support: no Republicans and just two Democrats opposed 
it.18 
One of the most important changes accomplished by Act 1 was to place 
responsibility for all these subjects under the control of a nonpartisan rather than 
a bipartisan body. The State Elections Board, which oversaw election 
administration until 2008, was a bipartisan board consisting of eight members.19 
One member was appointed by each of the following officials: (1) the chief justice 
of the state supreme court; (2) the governor; (3) the majority leader of the state 
senate; (4) the minority leader of the state senate; (5) the speaker of the state 
assembly; (6) the minority leader of the state assembly; (7) the chair of the 
Democratic Party; and (8) the chair of the Republican Party.20 In effect, control 
over the board hinged on the appointees of the governor and chief justice and, at 
various times, the State Election Board had an effective majority of either 
Democrats or Republicans. The State Ethics Board consisted of six members,21 
nominated by the governor with the advice and consent of the state senate.22 
Although its members could not be affiliated with a party, this did not provide 
much of a check on political influence.23 
A critical ingredient of the GAB is the method by which its board members 
are selected. All six members of the GAB must be former judges.24 The names of 
potential board members are put forward by a candidate committee, consisting of 
one court of appeals judge from each of the four districts.25 All members of the 
 
14. Id. at 115. 
15. Id. at 117. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Tom Tolan, Nonpartisan Government Accountability Board Faces Partisan Charges, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL (June 7, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/123419369.html.. 
19. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 115. 
20. Id. Parties were qualified to select a member of the board if they obtained at least ten 
percent of the vote in the most recent gubernatorial election. WIS. STAT. § 15.61 (repealed 2007). 
Between 2002 and 2007, the State Elections Board also had a Libertarian Party designate. HUEFNER 
ET AL., supra note 12, at 128 n.23. 
21. WIS. STAT. § 15.62 (repealed effective 2008). 
22. Id. § 15.07(1)(a) (repealed 2007). 
23. Christian M. Sande, Where Perception Meets Reality: The Elusive Goal of Impartial Election 
Oversight, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 729, 746 (2008). 
24. WIS. STAT. § 15.60 (2012). 
25. Id. §§ 5.052, 15.60(2) (2012). 
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board are nominated by the governor.26 Of the initial six seats on the GAB, three 
were to be confirmed by the state senate and three by the state assembly on a 
majority vote.27 Because the state senate was at the time controlled by Democrats 
and the state assembly by Republicans, this effectively gave each party 
confirmation power over three members of the original GAB. Subsequent 
members of the board must, by statute, be confirmed by a two-thirds vote of the 
state senate28—a provision designed to ensure bipartisan consensus and therefore 
moderation in the board members actually chosen. All decisions of the board 
must receive approval from at least four of the six GAB members.29 
Board members serve staggered six-year terms, with one member’s term 
expiring each year.30 A total of nine people served on the board between 2007 and 
2012.31 While GAB members are prohibited from engaging in certain political 
activities, like being a candidate for office or a member of a party, people who 
have engaged in political activities in the past are not prohibited from serving on 
the board.32 Three members of the board sitting in 2013 were previously elected 
to office as Republicans and one as a Democrat.33 The others had not been 
elected to partisan office before joining the board.34 As of August 2013, five of the 
six members of the GAB were originally appointed by former Democratic 
Governor Jim Doyle.35 Republican Governor Scott Walker has appointed one 
additional member and reappointed two of the original members, though none of 
these appointees has been confirmed to date.36 
By statute, the GAB is divided into two divisions: (1) the Ethics and 
Accountability Division, responsible for enforcement of campaign finance, ethics, 
and lobbying laws, and (2) the Elections Division, responsible for election 
 
26. Id. § 15.07(1)(a)(2) (2012). 
27. 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 § 209(4), 2007 Wis. Sess. Laws 1, 26. 
28. WIS. STAT. § 15.07(1)(a)(2). 
29. Id. § 5.05(1e) (2012). 
30. Id. § 15.06(1)(a) (2012). 
31. See Members of the Government Accountability Board, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF 
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (listing six current board 
members); Past Members of the Government Accountability Board, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF 
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/past (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (listing three past board 
members). 
32. WIS. STAT. § 15.60 (2012). 
33. Tom Tolan, Walker Appoints Judge to Government Accountability Board, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, June 17, 2011, at 2B. 
34. Tolan, supra note 18. 
35. Judge David G. Deininger, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi 
.gov/about/members/deininger; Judge Gerald C. Nichol, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF 
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/nichol; Judge Michael Brennan, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/brennan; Judge Thomas Barland, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/barland; Judge Thomas 
Cane, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/cane. 
36. Judge David G. Deininger, supra note 35; Judge Gerald C. Nichol, supra note 35; Judge Timothy L. 
Vocke, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/vocke. 
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administration.37 It is also statutorily required to employ a legal counsel to 
“perform legal and administrative functions for the board”38 and to designate a 
board employee as “the chief election official” of the state.39 Kevin Kennedy has 
served as the director and legal counsel of the GAB since its inception.40 He had 
previously served for many years as executive director of the State Elections 
Board.41 The Ethics and Accountability Division and the Elections Division each 
have their own division administrator, who reports to the director and legal 
counsel.42 They and all other staff of the GAB, like the board members, are 
required to refrain from specified political activities.43 
The statute creating the GAB gives it various powers and duties with respect 
to the enforcement of state election administration, campaign finance, lobbying, 
and ethics laws. Any person who believes there to be a violation of laws within the 
GAB’s enforcement jurisdiction may file a complaint with the board. Its powers 
include the investigation of alleged violations (with subpoena power),44 the 
bringing of legal actions to enforce state laws,45 the referral of matters involving 
criminal conduct for prosecution,46 and the promulgation of rules interpreting or 
implementing state election laws.47 It may also issue advisory opinions on legal 
matters within its jurisdiction.48 With respect to election administration, the GAB 
has the power to provide financial assistance to counties and to conduct 
educational programs for voters.49 It is also charged with responsibility for the 
state voter registration list, and for establishing and enforcing procedures that 
local jurisdictions must follow in maintaining the list.50 
Even before the creation of the GAB, Wisconsin’s State Elections Board had 
a reputation for evenhandedness and professionalism in its administration of 
election laws.51 This was true despite the fact that, as noted above, it was 
controlled by one or the other major party at various times. The GAB’s structure 
adds a level of insulation from partisan politics greater than what either the 
Elections Board or the Ethics Board enjoyed before. This is ensured both by the 
 
37. WIS. STAT. §§ 5.05(2s)–5.05(2w) (2012). 
38. Id. § 5.05(1m) (2012). 
39. Id. § 5.05(3g) (2012). 
40. Accountability Board Names Chief Counsel, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2007, at 2B. 
41. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 115. 
42. Id. at 116. 
43. WIS. STAT. § 5.05(2m)(d)–(e) (2012). 
44. Id. § 5.05(1)(b). 
45. Id. § 5.05(1)(c). 
46. Id. § 5.05(2m)(a). 
47. Id. § 5.05(1)(f). 
48. Id. § 5.05(6a). 
49. Id. § 5.05(6a)(11) & (12). 
50. Id. § 5.05(15). 
51. STEVEN F. HUEFNER, NATHAN A. CEMENSKA, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. 
FOLEY, FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED 43 (2011). The Elections Board’s staff was 
required to be nonpartisan. WIS. STAT. § 5.05(4) (2005). 
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means of appointment—specifically, the requirement of confirmation by a two-
thirds supermajority in the state senate52—and by the provision that the governor 
may only remove members for cause.53 The fact that the GAB is composed of 
former judges, who are less likely to have an incentive to make decisions with an 
eye toward securing some future position, also helps provide some insulation to 
the board’s decision making. To be sure, this structure does not guarantee that the 
GAB’s decisions will be free of partisan bias. But it does increase the likelihood of 
having politically neutral board members while reducing the likelihood that they 
will cater to either major party. 
In this respect, the GAB is unique among state chief election authorities. As 
summarized in the table below, the predominant mode of selecting state chief 
election authorities in the United States is through partisan election. This is the 
manner in which thirty-five states select their chief election official, usually the 
secretary of state.54 In the other states, the state chief election authority—either an 
individual or a multimember board—is appointed. 
 














Equal no. of 
Ds and Rs
Nonpartisan 
AL, AK, AZ, 
AR*, CA, CO, 
CT, GA, ID, 
IN*, IA, KS, 
KY*, LA, MA, 
MI, MN, MS, 
MO, MT, ME, 
NE, NH, NV, 
NM, ND, OH, 
OR, RI*, SD*, 










IL, IN*, NY WI 
* These states are listed twice because state election administration authority is shared by a partisan 
secretary of state and a bipartisan board.
 
52. WIS. STAT. §§ 15.07(1)(a). 
53. Id. § 17.07(3) (2012). 
54. Hasen, supra note 3, at 974–76; see also CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTION MGMT., 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION PROFILES OF ALL FIFTY STATES (2009) (explaining oversight of 
election management in states). The information in the remainder of this paragraph and Table 1 is 
based on these sources, supplemented by my own review of state laws. 
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Of the states with an appointed chief election authority, six have an individual 
serving as state chief election authority, while fourteen states (including 
Wisconsin) have a multiperson board.55 Of the states with an appointed individual, 
five vest the governor with appointment authority (sometimes subject to 
legislative confirmation, but not by a supermajority), and the remaining state 
(Tennessee) gives the state legislature the power to appoint the secretary of state.56 
Of the fourteen states with appointed boards, ten have a board that is structured 
(either formally or functionally) so that a majority of members are of one party; 
the other three have an equal number of Republicans and Democrats. While a 
board with an equal number of Republicans and Democrats may seem more fair 
than a partisan secretary of state, that model introduces the problem of gridlock 
with respect to controversial decisions.57 
The predominant models of running elections are problematic, given the 
inherent conflicts of interest they create for state chief election authorities. 
Specifically, there is a conflict between their obligation to the citizenry to 
discharge their duties without partisan bias on the one hand, and their incentive to 
make decisions that benefit their party on the other.58 This problem has arisen in 
several highly publicized elections, including the conduct of Republican Secretaries 
of State Katherine Harris and Ken Blackwell during the 2000 Florida and 2004 
Ohio presidential elections, respectively, the conduct of Democratic Secretaries of 
State Mark Ritchie of Minnesota and Jennifer Brunner of Ohio in 2008, and 
Ohio’s Republican Secretary of State Jon Husted in 2012. In all these cases, the 
state’s chief election official has been criticized by leaders of the other major party 
for acting in a partisan manner.59 Partisan motivation is inherently difficult to 
 
55. The careful reader will note that the sum of states with elected and appointed chief 
election authorities exceeds fifty. That is because, in five states (Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota) an appointed board shares election administration responsibility with the 
elected secretary of state. In South Dakota, the elected secretary of state is a member of the board and 
the other six members are appointed. 
56. TENN. CONST. art III, § 17. Tennessee’s chief administrative election official is actually 
the state coordinator of elections, who is chosen by the appointed secretary of state. TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 2-11-201 (2012). Tennessee also has a State Election Commission, consisting of seven 
members, id. § 2-11-101, selected by the state legislature. Id. § 2-11-104. I have not listed it as a 
“board” state, however, because its primary duties are to appoint and remove local election 
commissioners. See About the State Election Committee, TENN. DEPARTMENT OF ST. ELECTIONS, 
http://www.tn.gov/sos/election/statecom.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
57. The gridlock is particularly evident in the inaction of Illinois’s bipartisan Board of 
Elections. When asked to describe the board, one longtime participant in Illinois politics said “[they 
don’t] try to get too far out in front of anything.” David C Kimball, Illinois: Ending the Gridlock, in 
ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 190, 194 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser eds., 
2005); see also HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 63. 
58. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts of Interest in Election 
Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421 (2010) (arguing that conflicts of interest are a central problem in 
American election administration). 
59. Id. at 432; Massimo Calabresi, The Powerful Official Behind Ohio’s Vote, TIME SWAMPLAND, 
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/06/jon-husted-the-most-powerful-man-in-the-
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prove, of course, but critics of these chief election officials have pointed to 
decisions that seem likely to benefit the official’s own party. 
Wisconsin is the only state with a truly nonpartisan board structure. It is 
unique among the states in requiring supermajority confirmation of new 
commissioners, so as to insulate board members from partisan pressures. This 
does not guarantee decision making that is blind to partisan effects, but it provides 
a greater level of protection against partisan decision making than the structure of 
any other state. 
Although Wisconsin’s structure is unique among its fellow states, indepen-
dent election management authorities are the norm in the democratic world.60 In 
fact, independent election administration is widely viewed as essential to the 
integrity of the democratic process.61 The primary rationale for insulating election 
management bodies from partisan politics is to guard against conflicts of interest 
that might distort their decision making. As the influential European Commission 
for Democracy Through Law (also known as the Venice Commission) has 
explained: “Only transparency, impartiality and independence from politically motivated 
manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election process, from the 
preelection period to the end of the processing of results.”62 The International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance has likewise identified an 
“autonomous and impartial” electoral management body as an internationally 
recognized standard for fair elections.63 
The most common means by which other countries insulate election 
management from partisan politics is by having an independent electoral commission.64 
Australia,65 Canada,66 and India67 are among the countries with such a commis-
sion. In other countries, election administration is delegated to a government 
 
ohio-vote; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Epilogue: Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional 
Right to Vote 4 (New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 381, 2013) 
(discussing litigation surrounding 2012 election in Ohio). 
60. I have discussed other countries’ election management structures in greater length in 
Tokaji, supra note 3, at 137–42, and Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The 
Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 120–25 (2010). 
61. See LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 12. 
62. Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, at 26, 
Opinion No. 190/2002 (Oct. 18, 2002) (emphasis added), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/ 
WebForms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2002)139-e. 
63. INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 37. 
64. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 11; see also MASSICOTTE ET AL., supra note 1, at 83–97; Ihl, 
supra note 1, at 87–89. The discussion in the text relies mostly on López-Pintor’s categorization. 
LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 21–26. 
65. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 146; MASSICOTTE ET AL., supra note 1, at 99–101. 
66. MASSICOTTE ET AL., supra note 1, at 99–101; Frank Emmert et al ., Trouble Counting Votes? 
Comparing Voting Mechanisms in the United States and Selected Other Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3,  
8–9 (2007). 
67. David Gilmartin, One Day’s Sultan: T.N. Seshan and Indian Democracy, 43 CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO INDIAN SOC. 247, 250 (2009) (describing India’s electoral commission). 
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ministry which, though not formally independent of the ruling party, enjoys 
considerable practical insulation from partisan politics by virtue of having a strong 
core of professional civil servants. This is the case in several Western European 
countries, including Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden.68 Still other countries 
disperse authority among different components of the national government. An 
example is the French system, in which a government ministry and judges share 
responsibility.69 Such divided authority tends to assure fair election administration 
by providing a relatively impartial check on government power. While the United 
States is not completely alone in delegating authority to partisan elected officials at 
the state level, we are at the far end of the spectrum in the partisanship of our 
election administration system.70 
Compounding the challenges inherent in the partisan administration of 
elections at the state level is the extreme decentralization of the U.S. system. Most 
of the authority for running elections lies with state election officials, and the 
thousands of county and municipal officials scattered across the country. In 
contrast to virtually all other democratic countries, we lack an entity within the 
national government that has power over election administration. It is true that 
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) created the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC), a four-member bipartisan board charged with overseeing 
some of its requirements.71 But from the beginning, this entity was designed to 
have as little power as possible.72 In the first several years of its existence, the 
EAC was plagued by multiple problems that hindered its effectiveness, including 
the late appointment of commissioners, inadequate funding, a lack of regulatory 
authority, partisan stalemate, failure to release information, and excessive 
deference to state and local election officials.73 As of 2013, the EAC was without a 
single sitting commissioner and some have called for it to be eliminated entirely.74 
Although federal courts have come to police election administration more 
aggressively in the years since 2000,75 most of the authority still lies with state and 
local officials. 
Election administration in the United States thus remains mostly a matter of 
state law and local practice. The means by which local election officials are chosen, 
as well as their degree of professionalization, varies dramatically from state to 
state—and sometimes within a particular state. While all states have election laws 
 
68. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 59. 
69. See Tokaji, supra note 60, at 121 (citing LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 22, 60–61). 
70. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 127. 
71. See id. at 130. 
72. See Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 428 
(2004) (describing the EAC as an agency “designed to have as little regulatory power as possible”). 
73. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 135–36. 
74. Amanda Becker, The Phantom Commission, ROLL CALL, Nov. 1, 2012, at 1. 
75. See Daniel P. Tokaji & Owen Wolfe, Baker, Bush, and Ballot Boards: The Federalization of 
Election Administration, 62 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 969, 969–71 (2012). 
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and a state chief election authority, much of the on-the-ground work of running 
elections rests with officials at the county or municipal level. Roughly two-thirds 
of local jurisdictions elect those charged with running their elections, with party-
affiliated officials in almost half of local jurisdictions.76 According to one study, 
forty-six percent of local jurisdictions have party-affiliated election authorities, 
while fourteen percent had bipartisan and twenty-nine percent had nonpartisan 
local election authorities.77 
The United States is therefore unusual in the degree of decentralization of its 
election administration system as well as its partisanship. In contrast to most other 
countries, partisan election administration is the near-universal norm at the state 
level and is common at the local level. We are also highly decentralized, more so 
than any other democratic country. This is evident both at the top of our system, 
in the absence of a national entity with real power over election administration, 
and at the bottom, in the wide variation among the thousands of local officials 
with day-to-day responsibility for running our elections. 
Although Wisconsin’s state-level election management institution is unique, 
the state is not immune from the problems that accompany the highly 
decentralized system for running elections in the United States. In fact, 
Wisconsin’s problems are especially serious in some respects. In particular, the 
degree of decentralization in Wisconsin is extremely high—even by the 
hyperdecentralized standard of the United States. In most states, local authority 
for running elections rests primarily at the county level. In Wisconsin and a few 
other states, however, most authority for running elections rests at the municipal 
level—that is, in cities, towns, and villages—although county officials also play an 
important role in counting votes, as we shall see.78 County clerks in Milwaukee are 
elected, while municipal clerks may either be elected or appointed.79 There are 
1851 municipalities in Wisconsin, ranging in size from tiny towns with just a few 
voters to the City of Milwaukee with hundreds of thousands of voters.80 
Despite its high degree of decentralization, Wisconsin also has some features 
that are hospitable to the evenhanded administration of elections. In particular, it 
has a strong good government tradition, stretching at least as far back as the 
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century.81 The state has relatively high voter 
 
76. Kimball et al ., supra note 4, at 453. 
77. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 4, at 1261 tbl .1. 
78. For a discussion of Waukesha County Clerk Kathy Nickolaus, see TIMOTHY R. VERHOFF, 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT IN THE MATTER OF WAUKESHA COUNTY CLERK KATHY 
NICKOLAUS, WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD. CASE #2011-04, at 2 (2011), available at http://gab 
.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/65/waukesha_independent_investigation_final_report_pd_71534 
.pdf. See also infra notes 176, 181–90 and accompanying text. 
79. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 113–14. 
80. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 51, at 39; HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 111. 
81. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 111. 
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turnout and its election officials have generally enjoyed a good reputation for 
professionalism.82 
All these features of Wisconsin’s election system distinguish it from all other 
states. Of course, every state has its own unique election ecosystem.83 For this 
reason, it is important to resist overly simplistic comparisons among states. At the 
same time, the fact that Wisconsin’s state election authority is so different from 
those of other states makes it particularly worthy of careful study—including 
consideration of whether this nonpartisan model should be exported elsewhere. 
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF WISCONSIN’S GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD 
The first five years of the GAB’s existence were an especially tumultuous 
period in Wisconsin politics. Despite its traditionally civil political climate, 
Wisconsin has not been immune from the intense polarization that increasingly 
grips the country. In fact, it has been a leading example of this polarization. This 
atmosphere presents major challenges for an independent board charged with 
fairly administering state laws governing the political process. This Part addresses 
five of the most significant election administration issues that the GAB 
confronted between its establishment in 2007 and 2012. In examining its 
performance in these areas, my objective is to consider how effectively it has 
performed its role of administering electoral rules fairly. This is an inherently 
subjective inquiry, of course, as reasonable observers may differ in their 
assessments of that question. That said, my overall judgment is that the GAB has 
been very effective in doing the job it was created to do.84 
A. Voter Registration 
In its first three years of existence, the GAB faced major challenges—
including a lawsuit filed by the state attorney general—having to do with its 
statewide registration database.85 Some background on changes in the way that 
voter registration is handled, both in Wisconsin and nationally, is necessary to 
understand this issue. 
Until 2006, Wisconsin was one of two states that did not require voter 
 
82. Id. But see JAMES K. CONANT, WISCONSIN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: AMERICA’S 
LABORATORY OF DEMOCRACY 83–90 (2006) (discussing Wisconsin’s tradition of professionalism in 
government, but noting more instances of discord and alleged corruption in the 1980s and 1990s). 
83. See generally HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12 (examining the different election ecosystems in 
Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota). 
84. The accounts that follow are based upon publicly available information including court 
filings, GAB memos, complaints filed with the GAB, and in some cases press reports. 
85. Van Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08-CV-4085, (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008), 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/vanhollen-order-10-23-08.pdf. 
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registration for all voters.86 Under state law, Wisconsin municipalities with fewer 
than 5000 people were not required to have voter registration.87 Only 312 of the 
state’s 1851 municipalities actually had voter registration,88 although approximately 
three-quarters of voters lived in jurisdictions where voter registration was 
required.89 As in most other states, registration lists were kept at the local, and not 
the state, level. Under section 303 of HAVA, Wisconsin was required to create a 
statewide voter registration database for the first time.90 The basic idea was to 
move lists from the local level to the state level, ensuring consistency and making 
it easier to keep track of voters when they moved from one jurisdiction to another 
within a state. HAVA’s statewide voter registration database mandate was 
originally scheduled to become effective in 2004, but the statute allowed states to 
extend their deadline until 2006.91 Like most of the states, Wisconsin availed itself 
of this extension.92 
Even before the GAB existed, the process of creating a statewide registration 
database was fraught with difficulty. This was due in part to the large number of 
local electoral jurisdictions in Wisconsin and the fact that most of them had no 
voter registration at all before 2006, but it was also attributable to technical 
problems. The State Election Board contracted with Accenture to create the 
software for its Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS), allocating $27.5 
million in federal HAVA funds for this purpose.93 The transition did not go 
smoothly. Among the problems with the new system were slow speeds in entering 
data, associated high costs for local election officials, data entry errors, problems 
in generating walk lists for candidates, and difficulties in “matching” voters against 
the statewide registration list.94 This occasioned a great deal of frustration on the 
part of election officials, much of it directed toward Accenture.95 As a result of 
these technical problems, Wisconsin’s HAVA database was not fully functional 
until August 2008.96 
The “matching” requirement is what ultimately led to litigation against the 
 
86. The other was North Dakota, which still does not have voter registration. Qualifications for 
Voting in North Dakota, N.D. SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.nd.gov/sos/electvote/voting/ 
voter-qualifi.html ( last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
87. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 113, 124. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 113. 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1) (2006). 
91. Id. § 15483(d). 
92. Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement and the Help 
America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1216 (2005). 
93. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 123. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 123–24. 
96. SARAH WHITT, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
HAVA CHECKS IN WISCONSIN AUGUST 6, 2008 THROUGH JANUARY 4, 2009, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/statistical_analysis_hava_checks_01_09 
_pdf_10016.pdf. 
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GAB, brought by the Republican state attorney general.97 In addition to 
mandating the creation of statewide voter registration databases, section 303 of 
HAVA includes the following requirement: 
The chief State election official and the official responsible for the State 
motor vehicle authority of a State shall enter into an agreement to match 
information in the database of the statewide voter registration system 
with information in the database of the motor vehicle authority to the 
extent required to enable each such official to verify the accuracy of the 
information provided on applications for voter registration.98 
The notion behind this requirement was that comparing the information in 
new statewide registration lists against the information in state motor vehicle 
records would ensure accuracy. Yet HAVA was not very clear on how this 
matching was to be done, or on the consequences of a failed match.99 
As a result, there was great variation among states in how they conducted 
HAVA matches and what the consequences of a failed match were.100 Some states 
required an exact match, while others only required a partial or substantial 
match.101 In terms of consequences, the typical practice is not to prevent people 
from voting due solely to a failed match, but instead to require that voters provide 
non–photographic means of confirming their information.102 The concern with 
requiring an exact match or disqualifying voters whose information does not 
match is that a nonmatch may be due to some administrative error. Specifically, 
errors may appear in databases for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do 
with fraud or eligibility such as typographic errors, transposed names, marriage, 
transposed fields (e.g., Yao Ming rather than Ming Yao), double names (e.g., Billy 
Bob [first name] Thornton [last name] rather than Billy [first] Bob [middle] 
Thornton [last]), hyphenated names (e.g., Gabriel Garcia Marquez rather than 
Gabriel Garcia-Marquez), and omitted information. They may be due to data-
entry errors that have nothing to do with voter eligibility.103 A large number of 
nonmatches occur when comparing voter registration databases with other 
 
97. See Van Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08-CV-4085, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 
23, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/VanHollen-Order 
-10-23-08.pdf. 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(I) (2006). 
99. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Institutional Reform: Lessons from a Historic Election, 
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.hlpronline.com/Tokaji_HLPR 
_012209.pdf. 
100. See Nathan Cemenska & Sarah Cherry, Key Questions for Key States: Executive Summary, 
ELECTION L. @ MORITZ 10–12 (Sept. 3, 2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/projects/ 
maps2008/50QsforExecutiveSummarywithlinks.pdf. 
101. Id. at 10–11. 
102. Id. at 11. 
103. Justin Levitt et al ., Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter 
Registration, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 4 (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
dynamic/subpages/download_file_49479.pdf. 
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databases for reasons that have nothing to do with voter eligibility. Prior to the 
2008 election, the GAB found that over one in five new voters (twenty-two 
percent) had information in the voter registration database that did not match 
motor vehicle records.104 
Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen’s lawsuit against the GAB 
arose from the board’s decision to allow nonmatched voters to cast a regular 
ballot.105 Its rationale was that many voters in this category were actually eligible 
voters who had been voting for years, and should not be denied a regular ballot 
due to a possible administrative error.106 Van Hollen, a Republican, disagreed with 
the GAB’s decision. While the complaint in Van Hollen v. Government Accountability 
Board107 was not very precise on the relief being sought, it alleged that the failure 
to “remove ineligible voters and to conduct or require HAVA checks” could 
result in tens of thousands of people being allowed to vote despite discrepancies 
that “may, in fact, provide evidence that they are not eligible to vote.”108 A state 
circuit court dismissed the case a few weeks later, concluding that there was no 
legal requirement that a voter be matched as a precondition to voting.109 This legal 
conclusion was correct, as neither HAVA nor Wisconsin law required that 
nonmatched voters either be removed from voting lists or required to cast a 
provisional ballot. Section 303 instead imposes a requirement that state election 
authorities enter into agreements for database matching with their state motor 
vehicle authority, saying nothing about any consequence on voters if the match 
fails. 
While this ended the litigation, the reliability of the GAB’s matching protocol 
remained an open question. After the 2008 election, the GAB attempted to 
determine the reliability of its matching protocol by examining the nonmatch rates 
 
104. Patrick Marley, Voter Registration Information Often Doesn’t Match Driver Records, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2008, at 1B. 
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of those who registered between 2006 and 2008.110 The GAB uncovered a large 
number of problems when conducting HAVA checks.111 According to a report 
prepared by the GAB, twelve percent resulted in a nonmatch.112 Thus, if 
nonmatched voters had been required to cast provisional ballots in the November 
2008 election, then between 18,000 and 24,000 voters would have been subjected 
to this requirement—seventy-eight times the number of provisional ballots cast in 
the previous election.113 Such a high number of provisional ballots, in a state that 
has traditionally cast few provisional ballots, would be expected to have caused 
considerable administrative headaches for election officials, poll workers, and 
voters alike. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that the GAB made 
the right call in not requiring nonmatched voters to cast a provisional ballot. At 
the same time, the GAB’s post-2008 study revealed serious problems with 
Wisconsin’s matching procedure—though ones shared with other states, which 
had similar difficulties implementing the matching requirement of HAVA. 
In the end, the GAB wound up following a process designed to remove 
from the list those who are not residing at their registered address, while avoiding 
the removal of eligible voters. To comply with HAVA’s mandate consistent with 
state law, the GAB sent two separate mailings to nonmatched voters, in an effort 
to ascertain whether they are really living at the address at which they are 
registered. In 2009, its initial mailing went out to 87,000 voters who were flagged 
in checks for non-matches,114 telling voters that their registration information did 
not match. For those whose letter was returned as undeliverable, the GAB sent 
out a second letter stating that the GAB has reliable information that the registrant 
no longer resides at the address under which he is registered, and giving the 
registrant thirty days to respond or be inactivated in the voter rolls.115 Those who 
did not respond or who again had their letters returned as undeliverable were 
deactivated. The GAB had statutory authority to do so pursuant to a state 
statute.116 In the end, some 8000 voters were inactivated following this process.117 
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According to the GAB, there was no evidence anyone on the list attempted to 
vote fraudulently in 2010.118 In some other states, the deactivation of voters in this 
way might be problematic. But the existence of Election Day registration in 
Wisconsin tends to mitigate this difficulty.119 Even if a voter is wrongly omitted 
from the rolls, he or she can still go to the polling place on Election Day, re-
register, and cast a ballot that will count. 
Maintenance of voter registration lists is an issue fraught with partisan 
tension, with Republicans generally urging aggressive purging of lists to prevent 
fraud, and Democrats urging a more cautious approach to avoid disenfranchising 
eligible voters. While the issue of HAVA matching has been a troublesome one 
for Wisconsin and other states, the GAB appears to have found a reasonable 
solution, handling the problems that emerged in a studied and careful way. In 
2008, it wisely resisted the call for nonmatched voters to be omitted from the lists 
or compelled to cast a provisional ballot; but in 2010, it implemented a process 
that complies with HAVA’s matching requirement, while avoiding unnecessary 
burdens on eligible voters. 
B. Early and Absentee Voting 
Early and absentee voting has been the subject of heated debate throughout 
the United States in recent years. The 2008 Obama campaign made extensive use 
of early voting in several key states, a tactic that was seen as helpful in improving 
turnout among the Democratic base. In 2011, after Republicans swept into the 
legislature and governor’s office in a number of states, they enacted legislation to 
limit early voting in a handful of states, including swing states Ohio120 and 
Florida121—much to the dismay of Democrats and voting rights activists. 
Wisconsin’s consideration of early voting was less charged with partisan 
acrimony than that of other states. Since 2000, Wisconsin has long allowed voters 
to cast absentee ballots at their municipal clerk’s office before Election Day 
without an excuse.122 While in-person absentee voting is similar to early voting 
(some might say functionally identical), voters are technically casting an absentee 
ballot. As with mail-in absentee ballots, the voter fills out an application at the 
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clerk’s office and is then given an absentee ballot. After marking the ballot, the 
voter places it in an envelope that is not tabulated until Election Day, rather than 
using an electronic voting machine or feeding the ballot through a scanner as 
would be done on Election Day.123 Like many other states, Wisconsin has seen a 
sharp increase in the percentage of people voting by absentee ballot in recent 
years, going from around six percent in 2000 to twelve percent in 2004 to twenty-
one percent in 2008.124 The large number of absentee voters in the 2008 election 
led some to question whether it would make sense to move to a “true” early 
voting system, in which voters would cast ballots electronically or through a 
tabulating machine, just as on Election Day.125 Some local election officials 
complained of the administrative burdens associated with processing large 
numbers of ballots in the days immediately prior to Election Day.126 
These concerns led the GAB to undertake a study of early voting, 
considering both changes the GAB might make itself as well as ones that would 
require statutory amendments. The GAB’s staff proceeded in a methodical 
fashion, examining the experience of other states as well as academic studies of 
early voting. It also conducted “listening sessions” with local election officials, 
academics, and members of the public.127 In the face of strong resistance from 
municipal clerks,128 GAB staff ultimately recommended an option that stopped 
short of full-scale early voting, citing costs and Wisconsin voters’ relatively high 
level of satisfaction with the existing process,129 as well as possible confusion 
among voters.130 Instead, GAB staff recommended a more streamlined version of 
in-person absentee voting,131 which would include: (1) allowing people to vote in 
multiple satellite locations (not just the clerk’s office),132 (2) keeping the hours for 
in-person absentee voting flexible,133 (3) allowing a simplified application process 
for in-person absentee voting,134 (4) changing the start date for in-person absentee 
voting from thirty to twenty days before Election Day,135 and (5) retaining the end 
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date for in-person absentee voting of Monday, the day before Election Day, at 
5:00 p.m.136 
In the end, the GAB adopted all of its staff’s recommendations but the last 
one.137 Instead of retaining the preexisting deadline for in-person absentee voting, 
the GAB recommended that the legislature move up the deadline to 5:00 p.m. or 
the close of business (whichever is later) on the Friday before Election Day.138 
This was framed as a recommendation because its implementation required 
statutory change. The rationale for the earlier deadline was that allowing in-person 
absentee voting to proceed through the day before the election put too much 
strain on local election officials, who were required to witness, seal, and sort 
absentee ballots. This made it difficult for them to complete the other tasks for 
which they were responsible in the immediate run-up to Election Day. The state 
adopted this recommendation through legislation enacted in 2011, which moved 
up the deadline for in-person absentee voting from the day before Election Day to 
the Friday before Election Day.139 
Reasonable minds can certainly disagree over whether moving up the 
deadline for in-person absentee voting was a wise policy choice. There is 
undoubtedly some tension between administrative costs for election officials on 
the one hand and voter convenience on the other. It cannot reasonably be 
disputed, however, that the GAB and its staff analyzed the question in a careful 
and methodical way, taking into consideration the costs and benefits of this and 
other proposed changes to early and absentee voting in Wisconsin. The same, 
unfortunately, cannot be said for the state legislature. The change in the deadline 
for early voting was adopted on a party line vote,140 as part of the same legislation 
that included the highly controversial photo ID requirement, which is discussed 
below. Still, the GAB’s consideration of the issue represents precisely the sort of 
studied approach to the question of early voting that one would hope for from a 
nonpartisan election administration body. 
C. Voter Identification 
In the years since HAVA’s enactment, no election administration topic has 
been more contentious than voter identification. HAVA adopted a limited ID 
requirement, applicable only to first-time voters who registered by mail. The 
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statute did not require those voters to produce photo identification; it also allowed 
documentary identification such as a bank statement, utility bill, or government 
document with the voter’s name and address.141 Since HAVA’s enactment, a 
number of states have gone further, requiring some or all voters to present 
government-issued photo identification in order to have their votes counted.142 
Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri were the first to impose such a requirement in 
2005 and 2006. While Missouri’s state supreme court struck down that state’s law, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s photo ID requirement in Crawford v. 
Marion County Elections Board,143 and Georgia’s law survived legal challenges in 
federal and state courts.144 
Given the intense partisan debate surrounding voter ID, it is no surprise that 
this issue has provided the most severe test of the GAB’s nonpartisanship. Since 
the 2010 general election, several additional states have adopted or toughened 
voter ID laws.145 Wisconsin is among them, adopting a strict government-issued 
photo ID law in 2011,146 which has since been enjoined by state courts.147 The 
GAB provided information to the state legislature when the bill was under 
consideration and recommended some changes,148 though it did not take a 
position for or against the bill.149 The implementation of the voter ID statute 
nevertheless precipitated what is probably the most serious threat to the GAB’s 
independence. 
 
141. See The Rules on Registering to Vote, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2004, at 6Z. 
142. For a list of state identification requirements, see Voter Id: State Requirements, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl .org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
143. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Elections Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 188–89 (2008). 
144. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009); Perdue v. Lake, 
647 S.E.2d 6, 7–8 (Ga. 2007). 
145. See Voter ID: 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl 
.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id-2011-legislation.aspx (last updated Jan. 26, 2012) (listing 
action on all state voter ID bills in 2011); Voter ID: 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl .org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id-2012-legislation.aspx 
(last updated Jan. 10, 2013) (listing action on all state voter ID bills in 2012); see also Voter Identification 
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl .org/legislatures-elections/ 
elections/voter-id.aspx (last updated Feb. 14, 2013) (featuring an interactive map which lists general 
voter ID requirement in all U.S. states). 
146. 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 §§ 1, 45 (adding WIS. STAT. § 5.02(6m) (2011) and amending 
§ 6.79(2)(a) (2010)). 
147. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11-CV-5492 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012), 
appeal docketed, No. 2012AP1652 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2012); League of Women Voters v. Walker, 
No. 11-CV-4669 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012AP584 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2012). 
148. Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Remarks 
Presented to Wis. Senate Comm. on Transp. & Elections (Jan. 26, 2011), available at 
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/kennedy_senate_committee_testimony_1_26_
11_pdf_12141.pdf; see also Core Principles of Voter Photo ID, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF 
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/node/1588 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
149. Letter from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., to 
Members of Wis. State Legislature 1 (Jan. 12, 2011) (on file with author). 
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Wisconsin’s voter ID statute (2011 Wisconsin Act 23) sets forth an exclusive 
list of the documents that constitute acceptable photo identification.150 Among the 
documents on that list is a student ID card from an accredited college or 
university, which expires not more than two years after its date of issuance.151 In 
implementing this requirement, the GAB made two decisions that aroused 
opposition from some of the Republican supporters of the ID law. The first 
concerned the statute’s requirement that student IDs have an expiration date less 
than two years from their date of issuance to be acceptable.152 Most college IDs 
lack such an expiration date, but the GAB voted unanimously to allow colleges to 
affix stickers on existing college IDs so that they could be used to vote.153 The 
second GAB decision that aroused Republican opposition concerned the use of 
ID cards from technical colleges. The GAB initially concluded that technical 
college IDs could not be used, but later reversed itself.154 Based on a textualist 
interpretation of “college,” the term used in the statute, the GAB concluded that 
IDs from technical colleges fall within the scope of an acceptable ID.155 The GAB 
reached this conclusion despite the fact that there was a failed attempt to include 
specifically technical colleges during the legislative debate over the voter ID bill.156 
Notwithstanding this legislative history, the board believed that the plain meaning 
of the statute required acceptance of technical college IDs.157 
The existence of such a disagreement would not, by itself, constitute a threat 
to the GAB’s independence. The problem in the case of photo IDs stemmed from 
another statute that was adopted in 2011, pertaining to state rulemaking (2011 
Wisconsin Act 21). This statute requires that proposed rules be approved not only 
by the body with policymaking authority over the topic but also by the governor.158 
 
150. WIS. STAT. § 5.02(6m) (2012). 
151. Specifically, the statute provides that acceptable ID includes: 
An unexpired identification card issued by a university or college in this state that is 
accredited, as defined in s. 39.30(1)(d), that contains the date of issuance and signature of 
the individual to whom it is issued and that contains an expiration date indicating that the 
card expires no later than 2 years after the date of issuance if the individual establishes that 
he or she is enrolled as a student at the university or college on the date that the card is 
presented. 
WIS. STAT. § 5.02(6m)(f). 
152. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability 
Bd., to Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 4–5 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://gab.wi 
.gov/sites/default/files/event/74/open_session_all_with_agenda_september_2011_pdf_17118.pdf 
(PDF pages 34–39). 
153. Id. 
154. Patrick Marley, Elections Board Reverses Itself on Tech School IDs at Polls, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Nov. 9. 2011, at 1B. 
155. Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Written 
Remarks for the Joint Comm. on Review of Admin. Rules 3 (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://gab.wi 
.gov/sites/default/files/publication/137/kevin_kennedy_jcrar_testimony_11_15_11_pdf_16716.pdf. 
156. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, supra note 152, at 2. 
157. Id. 
158. WIS. STAT. § 227.135(2) (2012). 
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The GAB has statutory authority to promulgate rules for the purpose of 
interpreting or implementing state election administration statutes.159 Under 
previous law, the agency alone had the power to promulgate a rule within its 
jurisdiction but, as a result of the 2011 statute, gubernatorial approval must also be 
obtained.160 
Although the GAB’s decisions with respect to stickers and technical college 
IDs were not initially made in the form of a rule, a legislative committee (the Joint 
Committee for Review of Administrative Rules or JCRAR)161 has the power to 
require state agencies to promulgate rules addressing the content of administrative 
decisions in appropriate circumstances. Specifically, JCRAR may direct an agency 
to promulgate an emergency rule if it determines that “a statement of policy or an 
interpretation of a statute meets the definition of a rule.”162 In the case of the 
GAB’s ID policies, the committee voted six to four along party lines—with all 
Republicans supporting and all Democrats opposing—to force the board to write 
administrative rules embodying their policies relating to technical college IDs and 
stickers.163 The upshot of the legislative committee’s action was to require that 
Republican Governor Scott Walker approve the GAB’s interpretation of the ID 
requirement before it could take effect. In addition, this process would have 
delayed the effective date of the ID policy approved by the GAB by 
approximately two months.164 
In the end, the controversy over the forms of acceptable ID was rendered 
moot (at least temporarily) by the decisions of two lower state courts enjoining 
Wisconsin’s ID law in its entirety on state constitutional grounds.165 Still, this 
episode is an ominous sign for those concerned about whether an independent 
election administration agency can function effectively when considering a 
contentious issue in an intensely partisan legislative environment. Due to the 2011 
changes to Wisconsin’s rulemaking process, a legislative committee may effectively 
require gubernatorial approval for the GAB’s interpretation and implementation 
 
159. Id. § 5.05(1)(f) (2012). 
160. 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 § 4, WIS. STAT. § 227.135(2) (2012). 
161. Wisconsin law vests the JCRAR with oversight responsibility over agency rulemaking. See 
WIS. STAT. § 227.19(4) (2012). 
162. WIS. STAT. § 227.26(2)(b) (2012). 
163. Patrick Marley, Election Panel Told to Write Rule on Technical College ID Use, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/election-panel-told-to-write 
-rule-on-technical-college-id-use-3l32ikn-133904558.html. 
164. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t. Accountability 
Bd., to Members of the Gov’t. Accountability Bd. 2–3 (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/ 
sites/default/files/event/74/12_13_11_open_agenda_and_board_materials_pdf_67032.pdf (PDF 
pages 75–84). 
165. See Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11-CV-5492 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012), 
appeal docketed, No. 2012AP1652 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2012); League of Women Voters v. Walker, 
No. 11-CV-4669 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012AP584 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2012). 
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of state election administration law.166 This leaves considerable room for mischief 
by elected officials intent on tampering with the GAB’s decisions and 
undermining its mission of administering elections without partisan bias. 
D. Reporting of Election Results 
The most embarrassing election administration episode to occur during the 
GAB’s tenure was the misreporting of election results during an extremely close 
state supreme court contest in 2011. Close elections have engendered heated legal 
debates in the modern era of election administration, from Florida’s 2000 
presidential election to Washington’s 2004 gubernatorial election to Minnesota’s 
2008 U.S. Senate election. The problems in Wisconsin’s 2011 election were 
attributable to mistakes by a local election official. The GAB’s handling of this 
dispute provides evidence of its capacity to function effectively in the incendiary 
environment that tends to accompany razor-close elections. It thus provides a 
window into how Wisconsin’s state and local election infrastructure would 
perform in the event of a higher profile postelection dispute. It also demonstrates 
the testy relationship that can exist between the nonpartisan GAB and party-
affiliated election officials at the county level.167 
On April 5, 2011, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David Prosser faced 
Assistant Attorney General JoAnne Kloppenberg in a general election for a seat 
on the state supreme court. Although Wisconsin Supreme Court elections are 
technically nonpartisan in that candidates do not run as nominees of their party, 
Prosser is a former Republican state legislator while Kloppenberg is a 
Democrat.168 And despite its nominally nonpartisan status, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has been riven by rancorous and highly publicized ideological 
conflicts, which have sometimes gotten ugly.169 Justice Prosser has been a 
protagonist in these dramas. He reportedly called the court’s liberal Chief Justice 
Shirley Abramson a “total bitch” and threatened to “destroy” her.170 Later, a 
confrontation involving Justice Prosser reportedly turned physical, with fellow 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley alleging that he attempted to choke her the day before 
the court was to issue its split decision upholding a controversial statute limiting 
 
166. See supra p. 595–96. 
167. County clerks (the chief election official at the county level) are elected as nominees of 
their parties. As noted above, municipal election officials are mainly responsible for running elections 
at the local level in Wisconsin, in contrast to most other states where this authority rests at the county 
level. But county officials do have important responsibilities in connection with some elections, 
including responsibility for reporting results and handling postelection proceedings. HUEFNER ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 114. 
168. HASEN, supra note 9, at 2. 
169. Patrick Marley, Supreme Court Tensions Boil Over: Prosser Says He Was Goaded into Insulting 
Chief  Justice, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/ 
118310479.html. 
170. Id. 
598 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:575 
 
public-sector employees’ collective bargaining rights.171 Although this incident 
occurred after the Prosser-Kloppenberg election, it is indicative of the high level 
of hostility among the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s justices. 
The April 2011 contest had strong partisan overtones, occurring in the wake 
of the collective bargaining bill which had recently been passed—and which would 
come before the court two months later. In fact, some observers viewed this 
election as a referendum on the collective bargaining reforms, which had been 
enacted by the state’s Republican legislature and championed by Republican 
Governor Scott Walker.172 
Immediately following the April 5, 2011 election, Kloppenberg led Prosser 
by just 204 votes out of approximately 1.5 million cast, with all precincts 
reporting.173 These unofficial results caused Kloppenberg to declare victory. 
Unfortunately for her, however, more than 14,000 votes from the City of 
Brookfield had been omitted from the vote totals provided by Kathy Nickolaus, 
the elected clerk of heavily Republican Waukesha County. The missing votes were 
not revealed until two days after the election, when Ms. Nickolaus called a press 
conference announcing that she had mistakenly omitted these votes, 10,859 of 
which were for Justice Prosser—many more than enough votes to swing the result 
in his favor.174 Ms. Nickolaus initially attributed the errant reporting of results to 
problems with “the saving of the data,” while also saying that she was not certain 
of the exact cause.175 Given that this error involved ballots that were outcome 
determinative, it provoked a great deal of consternation, especially from 
Kloppenberg supporters.176 Exacerbating the appearance of impropriety were 
Nickolaus’s ties to Republican political circles. Before being elected Waukesha 
County clerk, she had been employed for thirteen years by the State Assembly 
Republicans, serving as a data analyst and computer specialist.177 
The GAB immediately began an investigation, sending a team of GAB 
employees to Waukesha County to investigate. In the meantime, Kloppenberg 
requested a statewide recount, which ultimately showed Justice Prosser to have 
won by just over 7000 votes.178 The same day the recount was requested, 
Kloppenberg’s campaign manager filed a complaint with the GAB, alleging that 
Nickolaus had violated state election laws, and questioning her explanation of the 
 
171. Crocker Stephenson, Cary Spivak & Patrick Marley, Justices’ Feud Gets Physical: Prosser, 
Bradley Clashed on Eve of  Union Ruling, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 26, 2011, at 1A. 
172. HASEN, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
173. VERHOFF, supra note 78, at 2. 
174. Id. at 3. 
175. Id. 
176. Dave Umhoefer, Kloppenburg Overplays Election Quirks, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 
2011, at 2A. 
177. VERHOFF, supra note 78, at 4. 
178. Id. at 5. 
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reason for the initial discrepancy.179 This led the GAB to unanimously authorize 
an independent investigation into the Waukesha County results and, specifically, 
into whether Nickolaus had violated state election law.180   
The GAB conducted a thorough investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding the lost-then-found votes in Waukesha County. This investigation led 
to a lengthy report, concluding that the likely cause was the failure to upload 
Brookfield’s results into the county’s database.181 The GAB’s review team believed 
that the alternative explanation that Nickolaus had provided on election night was 
“not possible.”182 The GAB itself ultimately concluded that Nickolaus had 
violated a state law requiring the posting of all election returns on election night,183 
but also that the violation was not intentional.184 It directed Waukesha County to 
develop specified procedures for future elections to avoid similar problems in the 
future.185 
What insights does this incident shed on the GAB? As embarrassing as the 
incident was for the State of Wisconsin, it was through no fault of the GAB. The 
problem, instead, was a local election official insufficiently careful in uploading 
election results. In a state with 72 counties and 1851 municipalities, each with its 
own clerk, there will inevitably be some who are quite competent and others who 
are less so. Once the incident occurred, the GAB acted in an exemplary fashion. It 
promptly sent staff to investigate, and they appear to have left no stone unturned 
in trying to get to the root of the problem—analyzing election returns, reviewing 
election documentation, interviewing Ms. Nickolaus, and scrutinizing the database 
used by the county.186 Its investigatory process was transparent and the full report 
of its results was released to the public. The GAB’s executive director identified 
several areas in which further guidance from the board would be beneficial, 
including the posting of election results on election night, the handling of 
materials, and the correction of errors.187 The board subsequently provided 
guidance in each of these areas. The incident was thus used as a means by which 
to improve administrative practices, not only in Waukesha County but throughout 
 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 6. 
181. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Govt. Accountability 
Bd., to Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 9 (Sep. 12, 2011), available at http://gab.wi 
.gov/sites/default/files/news/65/gab_staff_review_report_9_12_11_pdf_17498.pdf. 
182. Id. 
183. WIS. STAT. § 111.84(2) (2010). 
184. Joanne Kloppenburg for Justice Campaign, No. 2011-GAB-04, at *2 (Wis. Gov’t 
Accountability Bd., Sept. 12, 2011) (findings and order), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/ 
files/news/65/findings_and_order_signed_pdf_75621.pdf. 
185. Id. at 2–3; see also Letter from Thomas H. Barland, Chairperson, Wis. Gov’t 
Accountability Bd., to Kathy Nickolaus (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/ 
files/news/65/corr_to_clerk_nickolaus_9_12_11_signed_pdf_18120.pdf. 
186. Kennedy, supra note 149, at 2. 
187. Kennedy, supra note 155, at 10. 
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the state. Whatever flaws in election administration are revealed by this incident, 
they cannot fairly be laid at the GAB’s feet. 
The same cannot be said of Kathy Nickolaus. The following year, she 
declined to run for reelection after another snafu in reporting election results. In 
April 2012, the reporting of results on election night was severely delayed, due to 
problems in uploading results from memory packs into Waukesha County’s 
system.188 This required Nickolaus’s staff to manually enter results for every 
candidate in every contest and compare them to voting machine tapes before 
posting the results. The GAB intervened and negotiated a solution with Waukesha 
County officials, under which municipal clerks would report election results 
directly into a new system created by the GAB.189 In addition, the Waukesha 
County executive reached an agreement with Nickolaus, under which she gave up 
her election night duties, handing them off to the county’s deputy clerk.190 At long 
last, Waukesha County voters—and for that matter voters across the state—could 
breathe a sigh of relief. 
E. Recall Elections 
Wisconsin’s election administration system was sorely tested by a series of 
recall elections that took place in 2011 and 2012. Altogether, there were recall 
elections for thirteen members of the state legislature, the governor, and lieutenant 
governor in 2011 and 2012. These recall elections not only challenged the 
administrative capacity of the GAB, due to the large number of petition signatures 
it was required to review, but also its status as a fair and impartial actor. 
The recall petitions were a direct result of the efforts of new Republican 
Governor Scott Walker and the Republican majority in both houses of the state 
legislature to limit public-sector employees’ collective bargaining rights. In early 
2011, Wisconsin became a hotbed of activity for liberal and conservative activists 
alike, as the state legislature debated the Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill.191 The bill 
triggered a walkout by all fourteen Democratic members of the State Senate, who 
fled the state for Illinois in order to delay the bill’s passage.192 Even before the 
bill’s passage, statements of intent to initiate a recall were filed with respect to all 
 
188. Laurel Walker, More Election Night Problems in Waukesha, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 
4, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/more-election-night-problems-in-waukesha-
il4sbmm-146106695.html. 
189. Press Release, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., G.A.B. Statement Regarding New 
Waukesha Cnty. Election Night Reporting Procedures 1–2 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http:// 
gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/65/nr_gab_statement_on_waukesha_county_election_night_11
192.pdf. 
190. Laurel Walker, Under Pressure, Clerk Hands off Election Duties: Facing Potential Call for 
Resignation, Nickolaus Relinquishes Power to Deputy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2012, at 1A. 
191. The bill was ultimately enacted into law as 2011 Wisconsin Act 10. 
192. Bill Glauber, In Illinois, Wisconsin Senate Democrats Vow Unity, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL 
(Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/116581183.html. 
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sixteen state senators (eight Democrats and eight Republicans) eligible for recall, 
and pursued as to three Democrats (Dave Hansen, Jim Holperin, and Robert 
Wirch) and six Republicans (Robert Cowles, Alberta Darling, Sheila Harsdorf, 
Randy Hopper, Daniel Kapanke, and Luther Olsen). With Republicans enjoying a 
nineteen to fourteen majority in the State Senate, control of that body would hinge 
on the outcome of the recall elections. 
Under Wisconsin law, a recall is available for all state legislators as well as for 
members of the executive branch.193 It may be initiated by any citizen over 
eighteen who resides in the relevant district, by filing a registration statement 
including a statement of the intent to circulate a recall petition.194 For the recall to 
go before voters, the petition requires signatures from twenty-five percent of 
those who voted in the district in the last gubernatorial election.195 There is a sixty-
day period within which to collect signatures, running from registration of the 
intent to recall.196 State law also prescribes circumstances under which a signature 
may not be counted, which include the failure to include the date, a date outside 
the sixty day period, nonresidence in the jurisdiction, and the signatory not being 
of the requisite age.197 To sign, one must be a “qualified elector” but not 
necessarily registered when one signs.198 Officeholders subject to a recall are the 
only ones permitted to challenge petitions; they have ten days to file a challenge 
and the burden of proof is on them.199 The GAB is charged with administration 
of the recall process for state officials, including the verification of petitions and 
determination of the dates for recall elections in accordance with state law.200 It 
has thirty-one days to determine the sufficiency of petitions and rule on their 
sufficiency or insufficiency,201 at which time the recall election is scheduled for 
Tuesday six weeks later.202 That determination is in turn appealable by the 
officeholder or petitioner.203 In Wisconsin, officeholders subject to recall run in a 
contested election against candidates from other parties, who are selected through 
a primary if there is more than one seeking to run from that party.204 
The GAB’s handling of the 2011 state senatorial recalls led to complaints by 
both Democrats and Republicans, mostly alleging that the board was not acting 
quickly enough to certify the recalls and order elections. Republican complaints 
about the timing of recalls received the most attention. The board set the recall 
 
193. WIS. STAT. § 9.10(1)(a) (2012). 
194. Id. § 9.10(2)(d). 
195. Id. § 9.10(1)(b). 
196. Id. § 9.10(2)(d). 
197. Id. § 9.10(2)(e). 
198. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE GAB § 2.05(15)(e) (2012). 
199. WIS. STAT. §§ 9.10(2)(g), 9.10(3)(b) (2012). 
200. Id. § 5.05(2w). 
201. Id. § 9.10(3)(b). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. § 9.10(3)(bm). 
204. Id. § 9.10(3)(e). 
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election date for the six Republican senators a week before the date for recall of 
the three Democratic senators.205 The recall petitions against all nine state senators 
were filed in April 2011, and all nine officeholders filed timely challenges to the 
sufficiency of the signatures against them.206 The GAB scheduled hearings on all 
nine challenges for late May 2011.207 It certified the recall elections for the six 
Republican senators on June 3,208 but delayed decision on the Democratic 
 
205. As it happened, the recall election for one of the Democratic senators (Hansen) wound 
up taking place before the eight other recall elections, because Hansen’s Republican opponent (David 
VanderLeest) did not face a primary in his bid to oppose Hansen. There was another potential 
Republican candidate, John Nygren, but the GAB found him to lack the requisite number of 
qualifying signatures to get on the primary ballot. As a result, VanderLeest was unopposed and no 
Republican primary was necessary. 
206. See Written Challenge of Senator Robert Cowles, In re Petition to Recall Senator Robert 
Cowles of the 2nd Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600011 (May 6, 2011), available at http://gab 
.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Sen%20Cowles%20Challenge%20to%20Recall%20Petition.pdf; Written 
Challenge of Senator Alberta Darling, In re Petition to Recall Senator Alberta Darling of the 8th 
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Written%20Challenge%20of%20Sen.%20Alberta%20Darling.pdf; Verified Challenge of Senator 
David N. Hansen, In re Petition to Recall Senator Dave Hansen of the 30th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 
0600006 (May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Verified%20Challenge%20 
of%20Sen.%20David%20Hansen.pdf; Written Challenge of Senator Sheila Harsdorf, In re Petition to 
Recall Senator Sheila Harsdorf of the 10th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600015 (Apr. 28, 2011), available 
at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Sen%20Harsdorf%20Challenge%20to%20Recall%20Petition 
.pdf; Verified Challenge of Senator Jim Holperin, In re Petition to Recall Senator Jim Holperin of the 
12th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600004 (May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files 
/Verified%20Challenge%20of%20Sen.%20Jim%20Holperin.pdf; Written Challenge of Senator 
Randy Hopper, In re Petition to Recall Senator Randy Hopper of the 18th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 
0600012 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Senator%20Hopper’s%20 
Challenges%20to%20Petition.pdf; Written Challenge of Senator Daniel E. Kapanke, In re Petition to 
Recall Senator Dan Kapanke of the 32nd Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600016 (Apr. 15, 2011), available at 
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Sen%20Kapanke%20Challenges%20to%20Recall%20Petition.
pdf; Written Challenge of Senator Luther Olsen, In re Petition to Recall Senator Luther Olsen of the 
14th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600010 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Sen%20Olsen%20Challenges%20to%20Petition_0.pdf; Verified Challenge of Senator Robert 
Wirch, In re Petition to Recall Senator Robert Wirch of the 22nd Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600005 
(May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Verified%20Challenge%20of%20Sen 
.%20Robert%20Wirch.pdf. 
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KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER 
IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR SHEILA HARSDORF, TENTH STATE SENATE 
DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20 
harsdorf%206.3.11.pdf; KEVIN. J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., 
2013] WISCONSIN’S GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD 603 
 
senators’ challenges.209 The GAB found the petitions to recall all three 
Democratic senators sufficient on June 10, 2011, a week after it had made the 
same determination with respect to the recall of the six Republican senators, and 
set their recall for a week after that of the Republican senators.210 
The GAB’s reason for delaying the certification of the recall of the 
Democratic senators—and thus the date on which the recall could take place—
was that, while the Republican senators’ challenges involved a straightforward 
legal question, the Democratic senators’ challenges raised factually complex 
questions.211 Specifically, the Democrats’ challenges rested on over 200 affidavits 
alleging fraudulent petition signatures, which required the board to review more 
than 200,000 signatures.212 This led the GAB to seek an extension of the statutory 
schedule for reviewing the recall petitions against Democratic senators, claiming 
that the unanticipated complexities that these petitions entailed provided good 
cause for an extension.213 Republicans cried foul, believing that the delay was 
harmful to the Republican senators subject to recall and beneficial to the 
Democratic senators. Republicans alleged that the board was “partisan” and 
biased in favor of Democrats by virtue of the fact that all six members of the 
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SENATE DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy 
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June 4, 2011, at 1B. 
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RECALL OF SENATOR JIM HOLPERIN, TWELFTH STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011) available at 
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20holperin%206.10.11_0.pdf; KEVIN 
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SENATE DISTRICT (2011) available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy 
%20wirch%206%2010%2011.pdf; see also Tom Tolan et al ., Recall Elections Set for 3 Democratic Senators, 
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GAB were appointed by former Democratic Governor Jim Doyle.214 This 
criticism overlooked the fact that three of the GAB’s original six members were 
confirmed by the Republican-controlled state assembly and that three members of 
the board were former Republican elected officials.215 It also ignored the fact that 
the Democrats’ challenge was more factually complicated than that of the 
Republicans, which concerned a relatively simple dispute over the sufficiency of 
the original registration statement,216 and that Democrats as well as Republicans 
complained about the speed of certification. While the delay may have tarnished 
the GAB’s standing as a nonpartisan institution in the eyes of some Republicans, it 
had good reasons for delaying its determination of sufficiency as to the three 
Democratic candidates. 
Ultimately, a state court judge granted the GAB the extension it sought,217 
and, after a nine-hour hearing, the Democrats’ challenges to the recall petitions 
were rejected.218 The courts subsequently upheld the GAB’s determination that 
the recall petitions were sufficient as to both the Republican and Democratic 
senators.219 Two of the six recalls of Republican senators ultimately succeeded, 
while all three recalls of Democratic senators failed.220 When the 2011 recall 
elections were done, Republicans maintained a one-vote majority in the state 
senate.221 
In 2012, recalls of Governor Scott Walker, Lieutenant Governor Rebecca 
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2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/event/74/memo_board_hansen_holperin 
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Within 7 days after an official makes a final determination of sufficiency or insufficiency of 
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WIS. STAT. § 9.10(bm) (2012). 
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Kleefish, and four additional Republican state senators (Scott Fitzgerald, Terry 
Moulton, Pam Galloway, and Van Wanggard) were attempted. Because the 
governor and lieutenant governor are statewide offices, the twenty-five percent 
signature threshold is based upon the statewide gubernatorial vote, making the 
number of signatures required several orders of magnitude greater than that for 
state senators.222 
The most serious challenge to the GAB’s actions during the course of these 
recalls concerned the process that it was required to follow in vetting petition 
signatures. As set forth above, the statute governing Wisconsin’s recall process 
sets forth grounds on which a petition signature should be rejected. Those 
grounds do not specifically include duplicative signatures or fictitious names.223 In 
response to an inquiry from the Walker campaign, the GAB took the position that 
it was not obligated to vet petition signatures for duplicates or ascertain whether a 
fictitious name had been used. Instead, the GAB maintained that the responsibility 
for challenging invalid signatures rested with the officeholder.224 
The GAB’s position on verification prompted Walker to file a lawsuit in 
Waukesha County Circuit Court, alleging that the GAB was failing to comply with 
its statutory responsibilities by failing to check for duplicative signatures and 
fictitious names.225 Walker’s filing of this lawsuit in a GOP stronghold was no 
accident. In fact, just the previous year, the Republican legislature had enacted a 
statute to allow plaintiffs to choose the venue in lawsuits of this nature. 
Specifically, a 2011 statute allowed lawsuits in which the state is the sole defendant 
to be filed in the county of plaintiff’s choice rather than in Dane County, the 
location of the state capital Madison.226 This enabled Walker to file suit in a 
county where he was more likely to find an ideologically hospitable judge. 
Although the GAB protested that implementing a more rigorous verification 
procedures would cost upwards of $94,000 and take up to eight extra weeks, the 
circuit court judge agreed with Walker’s position, concluding that the GAB’s 
process violated state law, and ordered the GAB to take reasonable steps to: (1) 
identify and strike duplicative names; (2) identify and strike fictitious names; and 
(3) identify and strike names where GAB could not determine that the signatory is 
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a qualified elector, including where addresses could not be determined.227 The 
circuit court judge made this decision despite the lack of an explicit statutory 
requirement that the GAB check for duplicates and fictitious names, and despite 
the fact that the statute expressly places the burden of disqualifying signatures on 
the officeholder. The circuit court’s decision was later reversed on other 
grounds.228 Nevertheless, the GAB chose to abide by the judge’s order by 
adopting a more rigorous procedure for verifying signatures.229 While the petitions 
to recall the governor and lieutenant governor eventually were found to have 
qualified, the more rigorous procedure required the GAB to seek a thirty-day 
extension of the period for verification,230 which was later extended an additional 
eleven days.231 The extra time appears to have worked to Walker’s advantage, 
giving him extra time to raise money in opposition to the recall effort.232 
Ultimately, the governor and lieutenant governor survived the recall, but one of 
the four Republican legislators was successfully recalled, handing control of the 
state senate back to Democrats in July 2012.233 
It is difficult to imagine a more toxic political environment than the one 
surrounding the legislative fight over collective bargaining and the subsequent 
recall efforts. This type of environment would test the capacity of any state 
election authority—partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. The GAB did not emerge 
from this episode completely unscathed. Although it is difficult to gauge the 
degree of damage, there can be no question that some voters, Republicans 
especially, have less confidence in the GAB than they did before. That said, there 
is no good reason to question the GAB’s impartiality. Throughout the recall 
process, it did as well as could be expected to conscientiously implement the law 
amid challenging circumstances. It even declined to challenge a questionable 
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circuit court decision imposing duties on the GAB that went beyond those 
imposed by the statute. In sum, the GAB performed admirably under extremely 
difficult circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Wisconsin’s GAB is unique among state election authorities in the United 
States. It is a genuinely nonpartisan institution, in an era of fierce and acrimonious 
partisan competition. Although the state legislature almost unanimously approved 
its creation, some members of that body undoubtedly now regret their vote. The 
GAB has made decisions unpopular with elected officials in both parties. On the 
subject of voter registration, the GAB initially adopted a position that displeased 
some Republicans, but later adopted a fairly aggressive list maintenance policy that 
some Democrats and voting rights advocates disagree with.234 It has also opposed 
widespread implementation of early voting, another reform generally favored by 
Democrats. In the implementation of the state’s voter identification law, the GAB 
adopted a position that angered some Republicans. On the other hand, it might be 
accused of failing to have acted aggressively enough in taking action against the 
Waukesha County clerk, who was aligned with Republicans. Finally, in its handling 
of the recall, the GAB made decisions unfavorable to both Democratic and 
Republican officeholders, although it has taken more heat from the right side of 
the aisle. 
Taken as a whole, the GAB’s decisions in the area of election administration 
have not favored either major party. Both have at times been satisfied and at times 
dissatisfied by the GAB’s actions. But in the end, that sort of balance should not 
be the guiding star by which its work is evaluated. Instead, the question is whether 
it has fairly and evenhandedly interpreted and implemented the elections laws it is 
charged with implementing. In that respect, the GAB has performed splendidly. 
While some might reasonably disagree with some of its decisions on the merits, its 
decision-making process has been meticulous, careful, balanced, and judicious. 
The GAB thus serves as a worthy model for the remaining forty-nine states, all of 
which still have partisan or bipartisan chief election authorities—despite the 
emerging international consensus that independence from partisan politics is 
essential to proper election administration. 
What remains to be seen is whether a nonpartisan model like GAB can 
succeed in the long term, given our hyperpolarized political climate which shows 
no sign of abating. Already, the GAB has seen some attempts to undermine its 
authority, most notably by requiring that its rules implementing voter ID receive 
 
234. See Letter from Robert F. Bauer, Gen. Counsel, Obama for Am., to Kevin J. Kennedy, 
Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 3 (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw 
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the approval of the governor. This is worrisome, given the importance of 
insulating election authorities from partisan pressure. On the other hand, the GAB 
was successful in resisting partisan pressures during its first five years. Although 
the board is sure to face more attacks from partisans in the future, its ability to 
maintain its independence in the face of contentious policy debates may ultimately 
generate public support for the institution, providing a strong disincentive for 
elected officials to interfere with its decision making. 
The GAB’s experience therefore provides a ray of hope for those of us who 
believe that the United States should move away from its partisan system of 
election administration, which has proven so problematic in the years since the 
2000 election. The conflicts of interest inherent in the dominant U.S. model make 
it unsuitable for a country that aspires to be the standard-bearer for democracy 
around the world. Those looking for an alternative should consider Wisconsin’s 
model. 
  
